In recent weeks, a series of events have taken place that are relevant for the present and the immediate future in the Middle East. Erdogan won re-election as Turkey’s president, Iran reopens its embassy in Saudi Arabia after restoring relations, and Israel is watching what is happening with great suspicion, hoping that perhaps the visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Riyadh might shed some light on the situation.
Israel is also preparing to announce its support for Morocco’s plan for broad autonomy for the Sahara under its sovereignty. This support has already been expressed in Rabat by the Speaker of the Israeli Parliament. Marta González Isidoro, journalist and international analyst, analyses all these changes in an interview with Javier Fernández Arribas.
Marta, to begin with the most recent developments, can we think that Israel is about to recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara?
It should be borne in mind that relations between Israel and Morocco predate the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Some 1.2 million Israelis are of Moroccan origin. Relations between the two countries are not only diplomatic, but also culturally very important.
This question was one of the proposals Morocco made to the United States before returning to the negotiating table with Israel, and it is therefore feasible for Israel to recognise Morocco’s sovereignty in the Sahara. Firstly, because it has no dispute with Morocco in this regard and, secondly, because it is possibly also a step towards Morocco relaxing its position towards the Palestinians and, in turn, recognising the Israelisation of the part of the territories under its sovereignty, which are the territories under C control.
Especially given Morocco’s role in Al-Quds. Moreover, in recent weeks there have been numerous agreements on research, arms cooperation, military and other types of cooperation. Relations between Morocco and Israel are working well.
They are working very well and have surprised even the Israeli administration itself, which did not think that relations would reach the level at which they have reached. Throughout the Middle East, this level of satisfaction is also found in relations with the United Arab Emirates and even with Bahrain, and to a lesser extent with other countries with which there is still a very marked anti-Semitism.
In the case of Morocco, relations are softening considerably and exchanges are very positive. Also noteworthy is the presence and role of the King of Morocco as prince of believers and mediator in Al Quds, a role, by the way, that is also attributed to the King of Jordan, and they have a certain amount of friction. In this sense, if Morocco, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia have good relations with Israel in the fields of innovation, culture and military affairs, it is also possible that they could play an important role in softening the conflict with the Palestinians.
Now that the Iranian embassy in Saudi Arabia has been reopened, what is your analysis of the situation?
It is also part of the economic and diplomatic diversification that Saudi Arabia has been carrying out for years, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the United States and the entry of new actors. I think this is a positive step in the sense that it reduces the intensity of the disagreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially in the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Hormuz and in relation to the Houthis in Yemen.
Secondly, I believe that beyond this normalisation, which, on the other hand, is normal – it was a one-off event when diplomatic relations were broken off – these are two actors that have their own geopolitical capacity and a need to be hegemonic on the fringes of each other. There is a religious dispute that is not going to end, but I do think it is positive that the two can de-escalate the tension right now in Yemen or in Syria, because of the economic issue of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia’s plan to inject money and a pressing need for infrastructure into the Syrian economy.
In Yemen, as you say, there was a confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia had its troops there and Iran was supporting the Houthi militia. In this sense, de-escalation is fine, but what about Iran’s nuclear programme?
It is a programme that causes a great deal of concern throughout the Arab world. In fact, I have been saying for a long time that it was going to provoke a need for nuclear escalation on the Sunni side as well. This has been seen right now with Saudi Arabia’s initiative to return to the negotiating table with Israel and to recognise Israel and the requests it has made to the United States, which include having a complete nuclear programme. And, in addition, for it to return to being a strategic arms partner. So there will be greater tension if this programme does not de-escalate, if the IAEA continues to have such an ambiguous relationship with Iran, and if this Iranian regime does not ultimately find its place in the region, because it is a country that seeks regional hegemony.
It is a country that seeks expansionism. Since Khomeini took power, I remember the revolution of the cassettes, which they sold and distributed throughout the Arab countries to spread their creeds and ideas and gain influence in the region.
Iran’s idea of revolution is a political revolution that expands beyond the Shia confession of Islam. That is why it is so deeply rooted in areas where there are not only Shia populations, the so-called Shia arc, but also in Palestine or the territories or in the north in Armenia and Azerbaijan. What they are seeking is the export of a revolutionary political model that puts Islam in the place where it should always have been, politically and not only religiously, which is the role traditionally assigned to Saudi Arabia.
A theocratic state, where religion rules everything.
Absolutely, but in this case, expansionist.
When are we going to know the results of Mr Blinken’s visit to Riyadh? Because I believe that the United States somehow wants to regain lost ground.
That picture will be seen the moment the United States assumes that it cannot enter the Middle East, much less the Gulf area, with such maximalist human rights pretensions as it has, because it must understand that the Middle East has a concept of identity, nationalism and religiosity that is intertwined, and it has its times.
So, the United States knows it has messed up with Israel in terms of internal interference, it knows it has messed up with Iran by interfering in its internal politics, and the moment the outgoing administration starts to realise that this is not the policy and starts to pull back, there will be understanding.
I see that you don’t think Joe Biden will repeat in the White House.
So I seem to have a crystal ball, but what I do see in the last few weeks, apart from the polarisation that we see not only in the country but also in other parts of the world, as we have seen in Turkey, is that the proposals of this administration have little time to run.
You were talking about Turkey, continuity or change with Erdogan’s new mandate?
The population, despite how polarised it is in the two sectors, those who are more open-minded, more progressive and more inclined towards secularism, and a more conservative population, has finally opted for continuity and stabilisation. Another thing is that, from the economic point of view, which is in need of reform, the new minister is aiming for a gradual change, but that does not mean that he is going to change direction. It simply means that he is going to improve the standards at which inflation levels are right now, or at least try to modify them. I see continuity in all aspects, in domestic and foreign policy, because nationalism and identity are closely linked to foreign policy.
